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People deny health risks, invest too little in disease prevention, and are highly sensitive to the price of
preventative health care, especially in developing countries. Moreover, private sector R&D spending on
developing-country diseases is almost non-existent. To explain these empirical observations, I propose
a model of motivated belief formation, in which an agent’s decision to engage in health risk denial
balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention. I use
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“There is potentially another reason the poor may hold on to beliefs that
might seem indefensible: When there is little else they can do, hope becomes
essential.”
[Banerjee and Duflo, 2011]
1 Introduction
People cope with their anxiety about falling ill in two distinct ways. They either take
preventative measures or deny the severity of the health risk they face. These two coping
mechanisms are strategic substitutes. A person who takes sufficient precautions is likely
to remain healthy and has no reason to be anxious and engage in denial. Conversely,
a person who engages in denial about the health risks she is facing will deem preven-
tative health care investments less essential. I formalise this tension between coping by
investing in prevention and coping by denying reality in a simple model.
Consider an agent who experiences anxiety about contracting a disease in the form
of anticipatory utility, as in Caplin and Leahy (2001). For her, optimism about health
risks has the psychological benefit of reducing anxiety, but it carries the physical costs of
bad decisions, because it will lead her to forgo some sensible investments in her health.
Suppose that the agent chooses the belief that is optimal in light of this trade-off, as in
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Oster et al. (2013).
Choosing optimistic beliefs, or engaging in health risk denial, is more attractive to
the agent if her ability to act is limited. A limited ability to act may be brought about by
a low income, a lack of empowerment, or prevention technologies that are unavailable,
expensive or ineffective. These factors keep the agent from taking action, leave her
relatively exposed to health risks and therefore imply large psychological benefits from
engaging in denial.
By decreasing the perceived value of preventative health care investments, motivated
denial decreases the demand for prevention. It also makes demand more sensitive to
the price and the effectiveness of the prevention technology. A price increase not only
decreases demand through a standard price effect, but also increases the degree of opti-
mism, which in turn further decreases demand. Demand is especially low and especially
price-sensitive in resource-constrained settings, where, due to the agent’s limited ability
to act, motivated denial will be most severe.1
1Of course, underprevention in resource-constrained settings may be explained by several other
factors, such as liquidity constraints, exogenous overoptimism, or impatience. However, as I show in
appendix D, unlike motivated denial, these other impediments to demand generally imply demand that
is less responsive to changes in the environment.
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A denialist’s subjective health risk and her resulting valuation of a prevention tech-
nology are responsive to features of the market for preventative health care. Both sub-
jective risk and valuation are higher in the low-price environment of perfect competition
than under monopoly. However, because denialist consumers are more price-sensitive
than rational consumers, a monopolist charges them lower prices.2
Lower monopoly prices lead to lower profits, which in turn discourage R&D spending
on new prevention technologies, especially for developing-country diseases. The effect
of motivated denial on a monopolist’s incentive to invest in marginal improvements in
the effectiveness of her product is more ambiguous. While the agent’s lower demand
level provides a disincentive, her higher demand sensitivity provides an incentive for
the monopolist to invest. In resource-constrained settings, the former dominates and
incentives for marginal innovations are blunted.
My model provides a unifying explanation of several findings in the empirical liter-
ature on health behaviour (see section 2.1 for a discussion). This literature documents
optimistic beliefs about health risks, low and price-sensitive demand for prevention, and
little investment by firms in R&D. Moreover, these tendencies are generally found to be
more pronounced in resource-constrained settings.
The model also yields an important policy implication. In the absence of health
externalities, a rational agent’s preventative efforts should never be subsidised, because
her decision already optimally trades off the costs and benefits of investing in prevention.
In contrast, for a denialist, a tax-funded prevention subsidy increases overall welfare,
because it commits her to invest in prevention more frequently, thereby decreasing the
physical cost associated with motivated denial.
This paper applies the motivated cognition framework (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005) to the prevention of health
risks. I follow the optimal expectations model (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Oster
et al., 2013) in assuming that beliefs are objects of choice.3 By imposing the structure
of a prevention decision on the model, I am able to derive comparative statics that have
distinct empirical counterparts. The paper’s main contributions lie in demonstrating
that motivated cognition can lead to behaviour that is highly sensitive to changes in the
environment; in being the first to study the interaction of rational firms with denialist
2Denialists are not money pumps. Their behavioural trait actually decreases the material rent they
have to transfer to a monopolist. This is because the denialist has access to a substitute good: the
dream of a healthy life.
3I abstract from more elaborate models of belief manipulation, e.g. through information avoidance,
biased recall, or self-signalling. My main results concern the question of why someone would want to
hold biased beliefs (i.e. the demand for beliefs) and will be robust to different assumptions about how
people arrive at them (i.e. the supply side).
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consumers; and in showing that motivated denial implies welfare gains from prevention
subsidies.
The next section discusses the stylised empirical facts my model seeks to capture and
reviews related papers in psychology and behavioural economics. I set the model up in
section 3 and derive its main results in section 4. Section 5 features two extensions to the
model. First, I analyse contexts in which, contrary to the baseline model, anxiety may
induce the agent to invest in prevention. This allows me to ask when policy initiatives,
such as the use of emotive warning labels, may backfire. Second, I follow Bénabou and
Tirole (2002) by introducing present bias and the possibility of defensive pessimism into
the model. Section 6 derives the paper’s main policy result before section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Stylized empirical facts
In this section I describe a number of empirical regularities that are consistent with
my model of motivated health risk denial.
People are generally optimistic about health risks. Weinstein (1982) confronts
a sample of college students with 45 different life-threatening hazards. For 34 of these
hazards, students think that their risk is significantly below the average risk of their
peers. In line with the idea that people have anticipatory utility concerns, unrealistic
optimism decreases how much students worry. Overoptimism about health risks has
been found in many subsequent studies.4 (Proposition 1).
Health risk denial is decreasing in an individual’s ability and desire to act.
Banerjee and Duflo (2011) cite several examples of misguided beliefs surrounding health
care decisions in developing countries. They suggest that these are partly motivated
by the poor’s desire to remain hopeful when it is difficult to obtain effective and cheap
health care. As I argue in appendix B, HIV/AIDS denial among women is negatively
correlated with a country’s female empowerment (controlling for education), indicating
that those who are unable to protect themselves resort to optimism.
Oster et al. (2013) corroborate the optimal expectations model by Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005) in a study of the health beliefs and economic behaviour of people at risk
of Huntington disease. Individuals’ propensity to engage in denial is decreasing in their
4See (Weinstein, 1987) for evidence from a representative sample of people from New Jersey. See
Dunning et al. (2004) and Sandroni and Squintani (2004) for reviews of the literature.
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objective risk of having the disease, and, therefore, also decreasing in the costs associ-
ated with biased beliefs, like those stemming from suboptimal savings and retirement
decisions.
In a seminal experiment, Kunda (1987) finds that female subjects who are heavy
coffee drinkers are more likely to reject the validity of a study that links high caffeine
consumption to an increased risk of cervical cancer than female subjects who drink
little coffee. This may be explained by the greater cost the former group would incur in
changing their behaviour if they took the study at face value.5 (Proposition 1).
The demand for preventative health care in developing countries is extremely
low. In a survey of health behaviour in developing countries, Dupas (2011) documents
severe underinvestment in prevention. She cites the examples of malaria and diarrhoea,
which each account for over 15 percent of under-five mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa,
even though they could be effectively prevented by bed nets and point-of-use chlorination
of drinking water. Yet the coverage of antimalarial bed nets and point-of-use water
chlorination in the affected areas were each estimated to be under 10 percent (Miller et
al., 2007; Stockman et al., 2007). While it is plausible that some prevention measures
are simply not affordable for many people in poor countries, the high expenditures on
curative health care in these settings both suggest that many people could in principle
afford prevention and hint at its economic benefits.(Dupas, 2011). (Proposition 2).
Price effects on preventative health care investments are typically large. Du-
pas (2011) argues that developing-country prevention expenditures are very sensitive to
price changes. For example, Cohen and Dupas (2010) and Kremer and Miguel (2007)
find that moving from zero to positive prices that remain affordable to most potential
customers decreases the take up of bed nets and deworming medication by 75 and 80
percent respectively. Ashraf et al. (2010) find rather price sensitive demand for a water
treatment product in Zambia. Dupas (2011) concludes that both low demand and high
price-sensitivity for preventative health care are surprising, given that the individual
benefits of disease prevention appear to greatly outweigh the costs. (Proposition 3).
Private R&D investment into preventative health care for developing-country
diseases is extremely low. Kremer (2002) documents that private R&D investments
into diseases that occur specifically in developing countries are almost non-existent. For
example, Pecoul et al. (1999) find that, of the 1233 drugs that were licensed in the 22
5In the experiment, men serve as a control group that helps rule out alternative explanations. Their
assessment of the study is not correlated with their coffee consumption because, by design, men were
not threatened by the health condition in question.
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years before 1997, only 13 were aimed at tropical diseases. Limited R&D is not sur-
prising given the low demand in developing countries and the fact that pharmaceutical
innovation is highly sensitive to market size (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois et al.,
2015). However, since demand may be very sensitive to the effectiveness of the preven-
tion technology, limited innovation is also not a forgone conclusion. (Proposition 6 and
corollary 2).
2.2 Further related literature
Several experimental studies in psychology suggest that people become overopti-
mistic (e.g. by means of self-deception, selective recall, biased updating, or biased infor-
mation choice) because of a desire to feel good about themselves and less scared about
their future.6 Kunda (1990) reviews this literature on motivated cognition and points
out that its findings are broadly consistent with the somewhat more general theory of
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962).7
A small literature in experimental economics also documents that a person’s be-
liefs are often responsive to the affective benefits of being more optimistic or confident.
Mijović-Prelec and Prelec (2010) find that the incidence of self-deception in experimen-
tal subjects increases with the desirability of being self-deceived, as measured by the
expected profits that accrue to a subject in the state of the world a self-deceiver deems
more likely.8 Mayraz (2011) and Coutts (2015) uncover similar self-serving optimism.
In Eil and Rao (2011) and Mobius et al. (2011), subjects update signals in a way that
leads to a more positive self-image. Focussing on a strategic motive for self-deception,
Schwardmann and van der Weele (2016) show that experimental subjects become more
overconfident in order to better convince others of their ability.
This paper is most closely related to a series of papers that model individuals who
bias their beliefs in the service of psychological needs.9 Focussing applications that differ
6For example, in a famous experiment by Quattrone and Tversky (1984), subjects were told that
the duration for which they could keep their arm submerged in ice water is indicative of their life
expectancy. Those who were told that a long life expectancy corresponded to a long duration kept
their arm submerged for substantially longer than those who were told that a short duration was
indicative of a long life. Presumably, subjects tried to fool themselves into believing that they have a
healthy life ahead of them.
7Cognitive dissonance arises when a person holds two conflicting beliefs or desires (e.g. the belief
that she is at risk and a desire to feel safe). Moreover, people tend to strive for dissonance reduction
(e.g. by changing their beliefs).
8Kocher et al. (2014) provide further evidence for positive anticipatory emotions, though there is
no self-deception in their experiment.
9See Bénabou and Tirole (2016) for a recent survey of the nascent behavioural economics literature
on motivated beliefs.
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from mine, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Brunnermeier et al. (2007) and Bénabou
(2013), like me, emphasise an anticipatory utility motive for biased beliefs. The model in
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) stresses the related motive of cognitive dissonance reduction.
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) focus on people’s fear of death, while the models in Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002) point to the motivational benefits
of strategic ignorance and optimism.
Caplin and Leahy (2001), Caplin and Eliaz (2003), Kőszegi (2003) and Kőszegi (2006)
model anxiety as direct utility from beliefs, but do not equip their agents with the ability
to choose their beliefs. Kőszegi (2003) studies an anxious individual’s decision to go
to the doctor and her choice of the doctor’s quality. In Kőszegi (2006), an informed
agent transmits information to a principal with anticipatory utility concerns so as to
maximise the principal’s utility. Caplin and Eliaz (2003) analyse how to compel anxious
individuals to get tested for HIV.
The implication of exogenously biased beliefs in market settings are investigated in
de Meza and Southey (1996), Sandroni and Squintani (2007), Landier and Thesmar
(2009), and Spinnewijn (2013).
3 Model
I study a risk-neutral individual with a three period time horizon: t = 1, 2, 3. At
t = 1, she observes her true risk of infection, θ ∈ [0, 1], and then chooses her belief or
perceived risk, θ̃ ∈ [0, 1]. Alternatively, we may think of an altruistic parent who knows
θ and equips her child with belief θ̃. Under a third interpretation, θ̃ captures how much
attention an individual pays to risk θ.
At t = 2, the agent chooses x ∈ [0, 1], her probability of investing in preventative
health care. Investment entails costs p + c, where p is a deterministic price paid to
the seller of the prevention technology and c captures the discomfort of the medical
procedure, the difficulty of reaching a health facility, or the cost of exerting the willpower
required to make the investment (e.g. the self-control required to abstain from risky sex).
Cost c is the t = 2 realisation of a random variable C that is uniformly distributed on
the interval [0, c̄] and random from a t = 1 perspective.10
Let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the prevention technology’s effectiveness, i.e. the probability,
conditional on investing, that the technology offers protection. Then, the agent gets
10This assumption captures the inherent noisiness of future events. It assures that even a little
optimism leads to a bad decision some of the time, and results in beliefs and demand that are continuous




• Observes true risk θ
• Belief choice θ̃
t = 2
• Cost C ∼ U [0, c̄] is realised
• Investment choice x ∈ [0, 1]
• Anticipatory payoffs sE2[U3]
t = 3
• Physical payoffs U3:
V − x(c+ p) if healthy
V − L− x(c+ p) if infected
✲Knows θ Beliefs θ̃
Figure 1 Timing of the agent’s actions and the realisation of payoffs
infected with probability (1 − α)θ if she invests and with probability θ if she fails to
invest. At t = 3, a healthy agent obtains physical payoffs of V − x(p + c), whereas an
infected individual suffers a loss of L, yielding payoffs of V − L− x(p+ c).
The agent’s total utility is the weighted sum of t = 3 physical payoffs and anticipatory
payoffs, i.e. the agent’s savouring, anxiety or dread. Let Et and Ut denote the agent’s
expectations and payoffs at t and assume (for now) that there is no time-discounting.
Then, the agent’s objective at t = 1 and t = 2 can be written as
















where s < 1 denotes the weight the agent places on anticipatory utility, i.e. her propen-
sity to feel anxious or the salience of future outcomes. Anticipatory payoffs, the respec-
tive second terms in 1 and 2, are utility flows from the agent’s t = 2 expectation of
physical payoffs and are thus based on her perceived risk θ̃. Physical payoffs, the re-
spective first terms in 1 and 2, are evaluated at the true risk, θ, before the belief choice
at t = 1, but at possibly biased beliefs, θ̃, thereafter. The timing of the agent’s choices
and payoffs is summarised in Figure 1.
At t = 2, the agent finds it optimal to invest in prevention if and only if
(1 + s)E2
[




U3 (x = 0) |θ̃
]
(1 + s)(V − (1− α)θ̃L− c− p) ≥(1 + s)(V − θ̃L)
Assuming that she invests when she is indifferent between investing and not investing,
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1 if αθ̃L ≥ c+ p
0 otherwise
(3)
Consistent with the four core constructs in the health belief model (Janz and Becker,
1984), commonly used by psychologists to understand changes in health behaviour,
investment or behavioural change is more likely when the the perceived susceptibility to
a health problem (i.e. θ̃) is high, when the perceived severity of a condition (i.e. L)
is high, when the perceived benefits or the efficacy of engaging in a health-promoting
behaviour (i.e. α) is high, and when perceived barriers to taking action (i.e. c+p) are low.
In my model, only the perceived susceptibility may differ from reality, but the model’s
insights readily translate to cases where other variables are subject to misperception or
even directed belief manipulation.
At t = 1, the agent chooses her belief θ̃ ∈ [0, 1] under consideration of the anticipatory
benefits and the distorted investment decision it will induce. To eliminate uninteresting
cases, I make the assumption that even a realistic agent does not always find it profitable
to invest in prevention, i.e. αθL < c̄+ p. The agent’s t = 1 expected utility is


































Because c is random from the perspective of t = 1, the agent forms an expectation
over whether the realisation of c induces investment. The first terms of each line in (4)
express, respectively, the physical and anticipatory payoffs from investing in prevention
weighted by the probability that investment occurs. The second terms express the ex-
pected payoffs for cost realisations that induce the agent to forgo investing in prevention.
If the agent engages in denial, i.e. θ̃ < θ, her anticipatory utility increases. However,
gains in anticipatory utility come at the potential cost of impaired decision making, i.e.
when an agent should invest in light of her objective risks, but fails to do so because she
is optimistic. To see this, note that the physical payoffs, in the first line, are maximised
at θ̃ = θ.
I often refer to an individual’s ability to act, which I define as follows.
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Definition 1. The agent’s ability to act is low if the price, p, and the expected investment
cost, c̄/2, are high and the effectiveness of the prevention technology, α, is low.
In poor-country settings people often find their ability to act constrained, because
prevention costs are high relative to their incomes (high p and c̄/2), there are many drains
on self-control and willpower (high c̄/2), and the effectiveness of prevention conditional
on investing is limited by bad medical advice and a lack of empowerment (low α).11 The
expected loss conditional on not investing, θL, may be higher or lower in poor compared
to rich settings: while the risk of contracting certain diseases is higher, the opportunity
cost of contracting a disease, L, is likely to be depressed by a low life expectancy and a
high general disease burden.
4 Analysis
4.1 Optimal beliefs
For now, I assume that the price p is exogenously given. Therefore, I consider the
effect of changes in the environment in the absence of strategic responses by the sellers
of the prevention technology. This assumption fits the setting of most randomised
controlled trials and speaks to the short-term effects of policy interventions as well as
the general effects of interventions in domains void of markets. The agent’s optimal
belief is simply the perceived risk θ̃ that maximises her t = 1 expected utility in (4).











It is weakly decreasing in i) the weight on anticipatory utility, s, ii) the price, p, and iii)
the expected investment cost, c̄/2. It is weakly increasing in iv) the effectiveness of the
prevention technology, α, v) the potential loss, L, and vi) the true risk of infection, θ.
The model nests the rational baseline as a special case: when s = 0, the optimal
belief is realism, i.e. θ̃∗ = θ. As in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), when s > 0, the
agent always exhibits at least some optimism. Starting from θ̃∗ = θ, slightly decreasing
her belief entails physical costs that are of second order compared to the first order
anticipatory benefits. Physical costs are small for modest optimism because mistakes
occur infrequently (i.e. with probability α(θ − θ̃)L/c̄) and are small on average.
11See appendix B for a discussion of how a lack of empowerment maps into a low α.
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The intuition behind comparative static i is simple. The higher the relative weight
on anticipatory emotions, the more the agent is willing to inflate them by lowering her
perceived risk, while incurring the physical costs of underprevention.12 Results ii and
iii have the underlying intuition that, when the expected investment cost and price
are high, the agent goes unprotected relatively often and the psychological benefits of
underestimating the likelihood of infection are therefore large, i.e. there is a lot to be
scared about. Result iv follows a similar logic. An ineffective prevention technology
implies that investment occurs less frequently. And even if the agent invests in preven-
tion, she may contract the disease with a high likelihood, which in turn implies a high
psychological benefit from engaging in denial.
These results may be summarised as follows. Denial is decreasing in an individ-
ual’s ability and desire to act on accurate information. We therefore expect denial
to be more prevalent among less empowered groups, e.g. women in male-dominated
societies, and among those who do not have access to cost-effective, state-of-the-art
health care. In general, health risk denial is likely to be more pronounced in resource-
constrained, developing-country settings. In developed countries, the highest prevalence
of misguided patient beliefs and the presence of quacks (i.e. fraudulent medical practi-
tioners that facilitate denial) will be found for health conditions that do not allow for
effective preventative measures or cures. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) cite the example of
back pain.
According to results v and vi, a higher loss L and a higher objective risk θ discipline
the individual’s desire to engage in denial. While both the physical costs and the
psychological benefits associated with being more optimistic are increasing in θ and L,
the assumption that s < 1 implies that more weight is put on the costs.
Empirical work often elicits how stressed or anxious people feel about contracting
a certain disease, rather than obtaining their assessment of objective risks. How anx-
ious the agent is depends on how she expects to cope behaviourally (i.e. by exerting
preventative effort) and on how she expects to cope psychologically (i.e. by denying or
not focussing on the risk in question). In appendix C I derive a closed form solution
for experienced anxiety and show that, paradoxically, motivated denial implies that the
anxiety an individual experiences can be increasing in her ability to act.
12Note that this result need not hold when anxiety not only drives optimism, but also directly
impacts upon an individual’s propensity to invest in prevention. This scenario is explored in section
5.1.
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4.2 The demand for preventative health care
4.2.1 Motivated denial depresses demand
The expected demand for preventative health care is given by the ex ante probability





















if α2θL− αp > sc̄
0 otherwise
where the superscript d denotes the denialist, who is characterised by s > 0.13 By
comparison, the ex ante probability that a realist, i.e. an agent with s = 0, invests is
given by






if αθL− p > 0
0 otherwise
(6)
It is straightforward to see that the realist invests in prevention more often than the
denialist. Intuitively, the more an individual is in denial, the less worthwhile she deems
preventative efforts because, even in the absence of prevention, she feels relatively safe.
In what follows, I often assume that demand is positive to facilitate analysing the com-
parative statics of the agent’s demand.
Proposition 2. Suppose that α2θL− αp > sc̄, so that a denialist sometimes invests in
prevention. Then the denialist’s demand for preventative health care is lower than the
realist’s, i.e. Dr > Dd. Furthermore, the difference between a realist’s and a denialist’s
demand, i.e. Dr−Dd, is increasing in the prevention technology’s i) price, p, ii) expected
investment cost, c̄/2, and iii) decreasing in its effectiveness, α.
When we observe preventative efforts through the lens of a standard model and
without observing beliefs, the demand for prevention may seem too low in light of the
available prevention technology, the benefits of prevention and people’s available budgets
(e.g. as proxied for by what they are able to spend on treatment). And it will seem
especially low in poor settings, which are characterised by a high p and c̄ relative to
people’s income, and a low α.
13Dd is also the aggregate demand in a population with unit mass and random investment costs,
but homogenous uniform cost distributions.
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When low demand coincides with an observation of misinformation or optimism,
information campaigns may appear to be the appropriate policy intervention. However,
the above propositions highlight that biased perceptions and underinvestment in preven-
tion may have the same underlying cause: an agent’s inability to act. As a consequence,
information campaigns might be ineffective if the individual is not also empowered to
take action.
4.2.2 Motivated denial leads to more sensitive demand
There are other explanations for the low demand for preventative health care in
poor settings. Perhaps the most plausible of these are liquidity constraints, exogenous
optimism, and impatience, i.e. the steep discounting of future utility streams. As I
show in appendix D, these alternative explanations generally imply demand that is less
responsive to changes in the environment. Motivated denial, on the other hand, can
account for the highly sensitive demand that has been documented in empirical studies.
The agent’s sensitivity of demand to a variable z, or her marginal demand, is simply
the first derivative of demand in z. One agent’s demand is more sensitive than another’s
to a variable z, if its first derivative is higher in the case of a positive first derivative
and more negative in the case of a negative first derivative. The following proposition
highlights that motivated denial leads to more sensitive demand.
Proposition 3. Suppose that α2θL− αp > sc̄, so that a denialist sometimes invests in
prevention. Then the denialist’s demand for preventative health care is more sensitive



















To understand the intuition behind the denialist’s more sensitive demand, note that
a change in price p, for example, impacts on demand in two ways: first, holding beliefs
constant, a price reduction leads to higher demand through a standard price effect; sec-
ond, by proposition 1, beliefs become more realistic, which further increases demand.14
Proposition 3 implies that the likely returns to subsidies and improvements in the
prevention technology may be underestimated through the lens of a rational model.
Furthermore, the first three propositions suggests that the triple incidence of optimistic
beliefs, low demand, and highly sensitive demand is consistent with motivated denial,
especially if, as evidence suggests, it is more frequently observed in resource constrained
14It is easy to show that the denialist’s demand elasticities are also more extreme than the realist’s,

















settings. Of course, a more direct empirical test of the motivated denial framework would
establish whether beliefs about unconditional risks vary with an individual’s ability to
act.
4.3 The market for prevention technologies
4.3.1 Market outcomes
Thus far, the price, p, was taken to be exogenous. Now consider a market setting,
where p is set strategically by a monopolist or competing firms. I assume that the timing
in Figure 1 is modified as follows. At t = 0, multiple firms post prices, or, in the case of
monopoly, a single firm posts a price. Firms commit to their respective price and may
not change it at t = 1 or t = 2.15
In setting their prices, firms only care about the shape of consumer demand and
might well be agnostic about the behavioural bias behind the demand function.16 Firm
i maximises her t = 0 expectation of t = 3 profits
πi = piD
d(pi). (7)
I therefore assume constant marginal costs and W.L.O.G. set them equal to zero.
Let the subscript m denote monopoly outcomes. The following proposition charac-
terises the market equilibrium in the case of a single firm.
Proposition 4. If α2θL < sc̄, there is zero demand for the prevention technology at



























The monopolist responds to the agent’s behavioural bias and the high price-sensitivity
it induces by lowering prices. The equilibrium price is therefore lower the higher is s.
The agent has a psychological substitute good at her disposal, which involves not pur-
chasing the prevention technology and instead dreaming of a healthy future. To limit
denial on behalf of the agent and keep the subjective valuation of the product up, the
monopolist thus needs to give up a material rent in the form of a lower price.
15I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, with the natural adaptation that the consumer’s beliefs
are an object of choice.
16This is not to say that firms do not deploy marketing tools that explicitly target consumers’ desire
and ability to engage in denial, thereby affecting the shape of demand.
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Figure 2 The denialist’s and realist’s demand for prevention (TOP) and respective
monopoly profits (BOTTOM)
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium allocation under monopoly. The denialist’s demand
curve is below the realist’s and it is steeper. As a result, monopoly profits from selling
to a denialist are lower everywhere and peak at a lower price.
When firms compete, I assume that, in the case of two or more firms posting the
lowest price, they have an equal probability of selling to the agent. The following
proposition then characterises the equilibrium when there is more than one firm posting
prices at t = 0 and firms’ prevention technologies are perfect substitutes.
Proposition 5. If α2θL < sc̄, there is zero demand at any price. If α2θL > sc̄, the
competitive equilibrium is characterised by the following price, belief and demand:















Following a simple Bertrand logic, competition leads to marginal cost pricing. Propo-
sitions 4 and 5 tell us that we expect more consumer optimism in monopolistic settings.
As market power gives rise to higher prices, consumers of the prevention technology find
it more and more worthwhile to switch to their psychological substitute good, denial.
Similarly, the agent’s valuation of the good also depends on the market structure, with
14
competition leading to higher valuations.
By comparing D∗c and D
∗
m, we can crudely study the effect of competition, and thus
competition policy, on the demand for prevention. Since we know from proposition
3 that an increase in p has a disproportionally large impact on a denialist’s demand
compared to a realist’s demand, we may expect motivated denial to provide a strong
case for competition policy as a tool for increasing demand. The following corollary
shows that the opposite is true, because the monopolist compensates for the demand-
reducing effect of denial by charging lower prices.
Corollary 1. Moving from monopoly to perfect competition brings about a smaller in-
crease in demand when the consumer is a denialist rather than a realist, i.e. D∗c (s =





Since p∗m(s = 0) > p
∗
m(s > 0) and p
∗
c(s = 0) = p
∗
c(s > 0) = 0, corollary 1 also
implies that the decrease in physical welfare a consumer experiences as the market for
prevention becomes more monopolistic is smaller if she is a denialist (s > 0) rather than
a realist (s = 0).
Since both the price a monopolist can charge and the demand she faces are decreasing
in s, her profits also decrease in s. A monopolist would thus have an incentive to deploy
any marketing tool that limits s and, therefore, the agent’s incentive to engage in denial.
If she can, the monopolist will also try to hamper the agent’s denial technology, i.e.
decrease her ability to engage in denial. For example, this might be done by using
persuasive advertisements and infomercials to frequently remind consumers of the risks
they face.17
4.3.2 Innovation
Consider a firm’s decision of whether to incur a fixed cost of K to create a new
prevention technology of effectiveness α, for which it could then charge monopoly prices.
This may be an HIV or Malaria vaccine, or a similar innovation that leapfrogs the current
technology frontier to an extent that it affords substantial market power to its innovator.
17The monopolist cannot benefit from the behavioural aspects of the consumer’s psychology because
she is selling a product that becomes more desirable the more at risk an agent feels and she therefore
cannot exploit consumer optimism. She would want to offer bets whose payoffs are contingent on the
realisation of the consumer’s health. Such bets could discipline the consumer’s beliefs or, where this
is more profitable, exploit them. However, the technical and legal difficulties involved in first verifying
that someone is sick and then making them pay for it can probably account for the absence of such
instruments in the market place for prevention. Of course, in other markets, instruments like this exist.
For example, Bridet and Schwardmann (2016) show that in lending markets, collateral may be used to
make a denialist pay for her optimism.
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It is easy to see from proposition 4 that both the price a monopolist charges and the
resulting demand are decreasing in s. It follows that profits are also decreasing in s and
so is the size of the set of parameters for which monopoly profits are larger than a given
fixed cost of innovation K.
Corollary 2. A firm’s profit from developing a new prevention technology is decreasing
in s. The difference between her profit if she faces a realist, i.e. πm(s = 0), and her
profit if she faces a denialist, i.e. πm(s > 0), is increasing in c̄ and α.
Motivated denial therefore decreases firms’ incentive to invent new products. More-
over, innovation is likely to be especially unprofitable in developing countries, where
people’s ability to act is limited and denial is most severe.
The model also allows me to speak about a monopolist’s incentive to invest in
marginal improvements to her product. Consider, for example, the decision of mak-
ing existing malaria prophylaxis slightly more effective.
Proposition 6. A monopolist’s marginal incentive to invest in improvements in the
prevention technology, i.e. dπm
dα
, is smaller for denialist than for realist consumers when
α is small, i.e. α < α̂, and larger for denialist than for realist consumers when α is





As s increases, demand becomes lower and more price-sensitive. The former effect
decreases the marginal incentive to innovate while the latter increases it. When the
agent’s ability to act is limited (low α and high c̄), the demand-level effect dominates
and incentives to innovate are blunted by denialism. When the agent is more empowered
to take action, the innovation-spurring effect of more sensitive demand dominates. The
proposition implies little investment in marginal improvements to prevention technolo-
gies relevant to developing-country diseases and overly much investment in prevention
technologies targeting rich-country diseases.
5 Extensions
5.1 Anxiety-driven health investments
In the baseline model, I assume that all benefits and costs are obtained at t = 3.
Instead, suppose that the investment cost x(c + p) is incurred at t = 2 and that the
agent’s anticipatory payoffs do not depend on them directly.
For example, consider the decision to practice safe sex. The main cost may stem from
exerting self-control at t = 2. But although resisting temptation is difficult, exerting
16
the t = 2 effort may not make the agent feel any worse at t = 3. Then, someone with a
higher propensity to feel anxious s, puts more weight on t = 3 payoffs relative to t = 2
costs, which in turn may make her more likely to invest.
Such anxiety-driven investments in prevention are likely to be more prevalent where
the investment cost mostly consists of effort, as in the case of abstaining from risky
sex, exercising more, or obtaining (free) HIV mother to child transmission prevention
from a far away clinic. The baseline model is probably more pertinent to financially
expensive preventative or diagnostic measures. Of course, many prevention technologies
are expensive relative to low incomes in developing countries. In the developed world,
CAT scans are an example of the baseline model’s assumption. Also captured by the
baseline model are preventative technologies that exacerbate the adverse consequences
of being infected even though they lower the probability of infection, e.g. malaria
prophylaxis.
Figure 3 depicts the new timing. It yields the following objectives.






Expected utility at t = 2: E2
[






where U3 no longer includes the investment cost. The agent now invests if (1+ s)αθ̃L ≥
c + p. So that, holding θ̃ constant, innate anxiety s has a direct positive effect on
investment. However, since θ̃ is still decreasing in s, the total effect of an increase in
s on the demand for health care is ambiguous. In the baseline model, an increase in s
brings about an unambiguous decrease in the demand for prevention. I again assume
that price p is exogenously given. Then the following proposition pins down the effect
of a change of s in the augmented model.18
Proposition 7. The demand for prevention is weakly increasing in s if 2α2θL > c̄+αp,
and weakly decreasing in s if 2α2θL < c̄+ αp.
The success of policy measures that aim to raise s, for example, by increasing the
salience of adverse outcomes, thus crucially depends on the environment. In affluent
settings with a well functioning health sector, or for conditions for which there exists a
sufficiently effective and cheap prevention technology (i.e. high α and low c̄ and p), a
higher innate anxiety or salience of future outcomes may lead to more prevention. In
these settings, a policy maker may thus seek to increase s by means of infomercials or
18The other main predictions of the baseline model do not change qualitatively once we allow for




• Observes true risk θ
• Belief choice θ̃
t = 2
• Cost C ∼ U [0, c̄] is realised
• Investment choice x ∈ [0, 1]
• Incurs cost x(c+p)
• Anticipatory payoffs sE2[U3]
t = 3
• Physical payoffs U3:
V if healthy
V − L if infected
✲Knows θ Beliefs θ̃
Figure 3 Timing of the agent’s actions and the realisation of payoffs in the case of
anxiety-driven health investments
warning labels on harmful products.
However, while such scare tactics may work in rich country settings, where individu-
als are truly empowered to take action, they can be counterproductive in poor settings.
Policy makers should therefore be weary of exporting successful health marketing from
developed- to developing-country contexts, where they might backfire.
Similarly, warning labels on alcohol and cigarettes may decrease consumption and
increase cessation for moderate smokers and drinkers, but lead to an increase of denial
and consumption for addicts and heavy users, for whom the costs of cessation are very
high. The model may thus help understand where and why there are boomerang effects
to warning labels on harmful products (see Robinson and Killen, 1997 and Ringold,
2002).
5.2 Defensive pessimism
Suppose that the agent is present biased. At t she applies a discount factor β < 1
to any payoff at t + i, with i = 1, 2. For present bias to matter, it is important that
investment costs are incurred before the benefits from investing are realised. I therefore
adopt the timing in Figure 3. The agent’s objectives at t = 1 and t = 2 are given by
Expected utility at t = 1: β
(














At t = 2, the agent only invests if (1+s)βαθ̃L ≥ c+p. This introduces a new conflict of
interest between the agent’s self at t = 1 and her self at t = 2. Even at realistic beliefs
θ̃ = θ, the agent invests less frequently than would be materially optimal from her t = 1
perspective, which would have her invest whenever (1 + s)βαθ̃L ≥ β(c+ p).
As suggested by Bénabou and Tirole (2002), the agent can overcome her self-control
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bias by manipulating her beliefs. In particular, the pessimistic belief θ̃ = θ/β can restore
material efficiency. Ultimately, the agent’s chosen belief optimally trades off the self-
control and the anticipatory benefits of biased beliefs. Focussing on the case where price
p is exogenous and present bias is not too severe β > 0.5,19 I arrive at the following
proposition.




β(1 + s)2 − 2s
−
s(c̄+ αp)




When β = 1, the optimal belief naturally coincides with the optimal belief in propo-
sition 1, and even when β < 1, the comparative statics, other than in s, are the same as
in proposition 1. It is easy to see that when s is small, the self-control motive dominates
and the individuals perceived risk exceeds the objective risk, compelling her to invest
more often. Moreover, such defensive pessimism is more likely when c̄ and p are low and
α is high. As in the baseline model, a limited ability to act leads to more optimistic be-
liefs. However, in the presence of self-control problems, a qualitative difference between
health attitudes in poor and rich settings may arise. The extended model is consistent
with pessimistic beliefs in rich countries and optimism in developing countries.
6 Policy implications
Consider a policy maker who attaches the same weight to the agent’s anticipatory
emotions as the agent’s t = 1 self and who therefore seeks to maximise a weighted sum
of physical and psychological payoffs. This is in the spirit of Caplin and Eliaz (2003)
who write that
Psychological realities of this type need no longer be seen as barriers to
progress in economic theory. Rather, they are profoundly enriching. The
time has come not only to acknowledge their importance, but also to incor-
porate them into policy analysis.
Suppose the policy maker chooses a subsidy σ and a lump-sum tax T to fund the sub-
sidy. The subsidy is paid out to the agent if and only if the agent invests in prevention.
Taxation does not entail a deadweight loss.
The agent’s actions proceed as in the timing in Figure 1. At an additional initial
stage, at t = 0, the policy maker commits to a policy pair (σ, T ). Suppose that p is once
19The latter assumption assures an interior solution, but is not necessary to solve the problem.
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again fixed. The policy maker’s objective function and the agent’s t = 1 utility under
subsidy and lump-sum tax coincide. This objective function is given by




































The tax T reduces the agent’s material as well as her psychological payoffs.20 Because
of the policy maker’s ability to commit to the tax at t = 0, the agent’s belief choice does
not depend on T .









σ∗, T ∗ = argmax
σ,T







In equilibrium, the agent chooses the optimal belief in response to the tax-subsidy pair
chosen by the policy maker. The policy maker chooses the optimal subsidy and tax
under a balanced budget and in light of the beliefs a given policy will induce.
Proposition 9. Suppose that α2θL− αp > sc̄, so that a denialist sometimes invests in





The optimal subsidy is zero when the agent has no anticipatory utility concerns and
positive in the presence of the psychological motive. In the rational baseline, with s=0,
the agent chooses the investment decision that is materially optimal on the basis of
objective beliefs. Any subsidy would only distort behaviour and cause inefficiencies.
In the presence of motivated denial, a tax-funded subsidy improves welfare. Recall
that the physical costs of motivated denial stem from the agent’s systematic tendency to
20Other things equal, paying the tax implies lower consumption at t = 3 and, therefore, the agent
also anticipates lower consumption.
20
underinvest due to her overly optimistic t = 2 beliefs. Assuming beliefs do not change, a
subsidy increases t = 2 investment and can therefore partially correct for this mistake.21
Welfare then improves further because beliefs are optimally adjusted to the presence of
the subsidy.
A similar welfare gain could also be achieved by a mandatory insurance for prevention
expenditures. Suppose that at t = 0 the agent pays a premium T to an insurance
company who commits to cover her prevention costs up to σ. Further assume that the
competitive insurer needs to break even in expectation. Then proposition 9 captures the
equilibrium insurance contract. The model may thus help explain why insurance premia
are often funding preventative health care investments. Insurance provides a way for
the agent to commit to better prevention decisions. Note that this motive is absent in
standard models of insurance.
I make the assumption that p is fixed. Naturally, when the producer of the prevention
technology has market power, she will increase prices in response to a subsidy and
thereby erode the subsidy’s effectiveness. Policy makers therefore need to pay heed to
the market structure and effective subsidies may require concurrent price regulation.
Positive subsidies are also optimal under a different specification of the policy maker’s
objective function. Consider a policy maker who puts no weight on the agent’s anticipa-
tory utility and is concerned only with maximising physical payoffs. Since investment is
inefficiently low from the perspective of physical payoffs, a subsidy can restore physical
efficiency by increasing investment.
Since optimal beliefs are decreasing in price, a subsidy leads to more realistic beliefs.
However, not all forms of paternalism lead to less denial. A subsidy reduces denial
only because it ultimately still requires the agent to make the investment decision.
Instead, forcing the agent to invest in prevention (even probabilistically) would lead to
more denial because it would decrease the likelihood that the agent’s biased beliefs are
pivotal in leading to an inferior investment decision.22
21Note that the subsidy exclusively impacts on welfare indirectly through its effect on the likelihood
that the agent invests in prevention. The subsidy does not enter the agent’s utility more directly once
its costs in terms of higher taxes are subtracted.
22It may still be optimal to force an agent to invest in prevention. This policy is more likely to be
welfare improving when risk and loss are very high (so that investing is a good decision on average and
the anxiety induced from contracting the disease is high) and the prevention technology is ineffective
(so that investing in prevention does not completely eliminate anxiety).
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7 Conclusion
People in poor countries are often optimistic about health risks and resistant to
information. They also tend to underinvest in disease prevention. It is therefore tempt-
ing to be pessimistic about the potential of policy interventions to increase people?s
preventative efforts. We may think that subsidising prevention will not induce much
behavioural change if health risks are underestimated and that misguided beliefs can-
not be altered if people resist information. Fortunately, randomised controlled trials
in developing countries show that subsidies and incentives are often highly effective at
increasing prevention. This paper explains why behaviour (and beliefs) may be surpris-
ingly responsive to incentives. It also shows that, if beliefs are motivated, incentives or
subsidies can improve welfare.
My model makes the maximally simple assumption that beliefs are freely chosen. It
is plausible that people’s ability to self-deceive is more limited than that. Of course,
if there are factors impacting on the cognitive costs of self-deception, these will also
impact on who self-deceives. Moreover, firms will try to influence cognitive costs to
their advantage. A better understanding of how the ability to self-deceive interacts with
factors in the environment is thus likely to further improve our understanding of the
distribution of optimistic beliefs across different settings and individuals. It might also
provide insights into whether certain nutritional supplements and homeopathy, which
gave rise to multi-billion dollar industries, function as self-deception aides.
Although economists and psychologists still know very little about the factors that
shape the cognitive costs of self-deception, insights are starting to accrue. For example,
self-deception seems to require some vagueness or uncertainty surrounding the variable in
question (Sloman et al., 2010). For this reason, probabilities, which are inherently noisy
and complicated objects, are probably particularly likely to invite the human tendency
to self-deceive in pursuit of anticipatory gains. Furthermore, it seems plausible that
informative signals make it harder to self-deceive, which could explain why denialists
might also exhibit information avoidance.23
In the presence of health externalities, one person’s utility depends on others’ pre-
ventative efforts. As a result, groupthink may arise (Bénabou, 2013). How health risk
denial forms in groups and how it spreads through social networks is an interesting topic
for future theoretical and empirical work. Another promising application of health risk
denial is insurance markets. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) study the case of exoge-
23See Spiegler (2008) for why optimal expectations models do not, without assuming supply side
frictions, imply information avoidance.
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nously optimistic insurance seekers. However, by setting contractual terms, insurance
providers exert some influence over insurance seekers’ incentive to become optimistic.
As a result, optimism may well be endogenous to the strategic interaction between firms
and customers.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Unconstrained maximisation of the agent’s t = 1 objective function, given by (4),
with respect to θ̃ yields the following first order condition
L(α2θL− (1− s)α2θ̃L− sc̄− sαp)
c̄
= 0. (9)
Note that the second derivative of (4) with respect to θ̃ is −(1−s)α
2L2
c̄
, which is negative
everywhere given the assumption that s < 1. Therefore, equation (9) characterises a







If θ̃sol ≤ 0, then any θ̃1 > 0 yields less expected utility than θ̃2 = 0. Because the
agent cannot believe in negative probabilities, θ̃sol ≤ 0 implies that the optimal belief is
θ̃∗ = 0. If θ̃sol > 0, then θ̃
∗ = θ̃sol. The comparative statics follow from the respective
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The inequality that establishes result i) is implied by my assumption that, even with
realisitc beliefs, investing is not rational in all states of the world, i.e. αLθ − p− c̄ < 0.

Proof of Proposition 2
The assumption that α2θL − αp > sc̄ implies that Dd > 0. Then, the difference





which is positive if and only if c̄ + αp > θα2L. I assume that even a realist does not
always invest in prevention at t = 2, i.e. that c̄ > θαL− p. This implies c̄+αp > θα2L.

















The inequality in result ii) is implied by the assumption that demand is positive, i.e.
α2θL− αp > sc̄. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
We define and derive the following differences in sensitivities under the assumption


























s (α2Lθ + c̄)
α2 (1− s) c̄
Since s < 1, we have that ∆p and ∆c̄ are negative and that ∆α is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 4











Profit is positive as long as p < αθL − sc̄
α
. Since profit is strictly concave in price, the











which results in positive profits. θ̃∗m and D
∗




and Dd(p) respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 5
We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium gives rise to each firm charging p = 0.
Beliefs and allocations then follow from propositions 1 and 2.
Suppose there are two firms in the market, firm i and firm j. Suppose that firm i
charges pi = 0 and firm j charges pj = 0. Then both firms make zero profits. There
exists no profitable deviation for firm i. Charging pi > 0 results in zero demand for
its product, and, hence, zero profits. Charging pi < 0 yields πi < 0 because demand
will be positive, but sales are associated with a loss. By symmetry, there also exists no
profitable deviation for firm j. Therefore, pi = pj = 0 is a Nash equilibrium.
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To establish uniqueness, note that if either firm charged p < 0 and drew any demand,
it would make losses and could increase its profits by raising its price. Moreover, pi ≥
pj > 0 is not an equilibrium because firm i could profitably deviate and charge pi = pj−ǫ
and earn
πi = (pj − ǫ)
(















that firm i obtains by charging pi = pj. Finally, pi > pj = 0 is not an equilibrium
because firm j could raise its price by a small amount and increase its profits. 
Proof of Corollary 1
To show that D∗c (s = 0)−D
∗
m(s = 0) > D
∗
c (s > 0)−D
∗
m(s > 0), we simply populate
the expressions on both sides of the inequality with the demands derived in propositions
4 and 5. 
Proof of Proposition 6

















= sign (α4L2θ2 − s2c̄2), the marginal incentive to invest is posi-






Proof of Proposition 7
When c is not subtracted from the agent’s anticipatory utility, the agent chooses her
belief to maximize the following concave objective function.

























































if (1 + s)α2θL > sc̄+ αp
0 otherwise
When D∗ = 0, then ∂D
∗
∂s








which is greater than zero if and only if 2α2θL− c̄− αp > 0 
Proof of Proposition 8
The agent’s objective function at t = 1 is given by














































The right side of 11 is increasing in s and so 11 is always satisfied if it is satisfied for
the maximum value of s, i.e. s = 1. This is the case if, as I assume, β > 0.5. Function
10 is maximised for
θ̃β =
θ
β(1 + s)2 − 2s
−
s(c̄+ αp)
(1 + s)(β(1 + s)2 − 2s)βα2L
The optimal belief coincides with θ̃β if θ̃β > 0 and, because negative probabilities are
not possible, is zero otherwise 
Proof of Proposition 9
For a given policy (σ, T ), the agent chooses her belief at t = 1 in order to maximize
her t = 2 utility, given by 8. If α2θL− αp > sc̄, so that a denialist sometimes invests in








Optimal beliefs are independent of T and the subsidy acts just like a price reduction.















































































The equilibrium subsidy σ∗ is strictly positive if s > 0 because c̄ + αp > α2θL. This
inequality is implied by c̄+ p > αθL, which I assumed to rule out the uninteresting case
in which a rational agent invests in all states of the world.
The equilibrium tax and belief are obtained by substituting σ∗ into 12 and 13 and
solving the system of equations. 
B HIV/AIDS denial is caused by an inability to act
In the context of a large generalised HIV epidemic, being in denial about some of the
risks and costs associated with HIV/AIDS may constitute an important psychological
coping mechanism and help reduce anxiety. The model emphasises that such denial may
come at the cost of impaired sexual decision making, since an overly optimistic individual
may fail to protect herself when the risk of infection does in fact warrant taking protective
measures. This cost, however, may be low for groups who lack autonomy in sexual
decision making. A lack of empowerment on behalf of women in many African countries,
in particular, may therefore help explain gender differences in HIV knowledge and risk
attitudes.
In terms of the model, a lack of empowerment or autonomy in sexual decision making
may be reflected in a high cost of protecting oneself, i.e. a high c̄. Alternatively, the
risk of potentially being undermined by one’s partner may be reflected in a low α. A
low α may also represent situations in which a woman may protect herself in all of her
voluntary sexual encounters, but cannot avoid the threat of being raped. That this
threat is real and prevalent in some contexts is reflected in South African estimates
that, based on interviews with women attending antenatal clinics, place the prevalence
of physical/sexual partner violence as high as 55.5% (Dunkle et al., 2004).
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Green et al. (2006) find that the social, economic and legal empowerment of women
played a crucial role in Uganda’s strategy to combat HIV/AIDS, which is widely consid-
ered to be one of the few successful HIV prevention campaigns in Africa. In particular,
they highlight the role of giving women more political voice, the strengthening of rape
and defilement laws and the allocation of property rights to women.
In a South African sample, 10.5 percent of African women compared to 1.71 percent
of African men believe that “HIV is harmless and does not cause AIDS" (Grebe and
Nattrass, 2011). Men, on the other hand, are more likely than women to agree with
the statement that “AIDS was created by American scientists". The stark difference in
the distribution of AIDS denialist beliefs compared to AIDS conspiracy theorist beliefs
points to motivated beliefs resulting from low empowerment, since other variables such
as educational attainment should have a negative effect on both kinds of beliefs. The
fact that female empowerment is low in South Africa is reflected in the high incidence
of partner violence against women. This has implications for sexual outcomes, as young
men who perpetrate partner violence engage in significantly higher levels of HIV risk
behavior than non-perpetrators (Dunkle et al., 2006) and women with low relationship
control are 2.1 times more likely to use condoms inconsistently (Pettifor et al., 2004).
Education is likely to play an important role in empowering women. In a field
experiment in Kenya, Duflo et al. (2006) find that reducing the cost of education leads
more girls to be “confident that they can say no if their partner wants to have sex” and
to realise that “when one has HIV, one eventually dies”. Training teachers to teach the
national AIDS curriculum or encouraging students to discuss condom use had no effect
on these perceptions, which indicates that it may be the empowerment that is associated
with education rather than the provision of information that shifts attitudes.
In a Ugandan sample, De Walque (2007) shows that the reduction in seroconversion
following a HIV information campaign is increasing in educational attainment. This
result is driven exclusively by women being more receptive to HIV information when
they are more educated. Since it is plausible that empowerment through education is
greater for women than for men, but somewhat less plausible that education affects men
and women’s information processing or cognitive abilities differently, this evidence lends
further support to the model’s predictions in the realm of HIV/AIDS.
It is possible that the mechanisms highlighted above contribute to a gender gap in
HIV knowledge that is observable in country-level data. According to UNAIDS/WHO
(2005), young men in a sample drawn from 35 countries in sub-Saharan were 20% more
likely to have correct knowledge about HIV than young women.




Figure 4 The correlation between gender differences in HIV knowledge on the SIGI.
a) unconditional correlation, for 38 countries, b) correlation conditional on gender
difference in adult literacy for 22 countries,
the gender gap in HIV knowledge and the social institutions and gender index (SIGI)
for a sample of 38 countries. The HIV knowledge variable 24 measures the percentage
of young people aged 15 to 24 who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual
transmission of HIV and reject major misconceptions about HIV transmission. The SIGI
25 measures social and institutional inputs to gender inequality such as laws prohibiting
and punishing violence against women, women’s ownership rights, dress codes in public,
the acceptability of polygamy and genital mutilation, and freedom of movement. The
index takes a higher value for greater gender inequality.
It may be argued that gender inequality impacts on HIV knowledge exclusively
through differences in education. Figure 4b shows that a positive relationship (signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level) between gender differences in HIV knowledge and female
empowerment persists once we make the gender gap in HIV knowledge conditional on a
country’s gender gap in literacy rates. The notion that low female autonomy incentivizes
denial is one candidate explanation for this finding. Another explanation may be that
learning information pertaining to HIV requires freedom of movement and interactions
with peers, which are undermined by social norms that discriminate against women.
24Estimates derived from household surveys (DHS, MICS) are presented here, as compiled and
reported by UNAIDS in the 2008 Report on the Global AIDS epidemics, Annex 2 UNAIDS (2008).




Lazarus (2006) cautions scholars of emotion that “separating emotion from coping
does a disservice to the integrity and complexity of the emotion process, which at any
turn considers how we might cope” (p. 37). The model imposes structure on how we
can think about the interrelationship between anxiety, cognitive coping, i.e. denial, and
behavioural coping, i.e. investing in prevention and thus predicts the level of anxiety
the agent ultimately experiences.
Surveys on health attitudes frequently elicit how worried respondents are about



















which captures the dread an agent of innate anxiety s feels anticipating the expected
physical loss L.
Consider the two effects on experienced anxiety of an increase in, for example, the
expected cost c̄/2. First, investment in prevention decreases, which increases the threat
of infection and, hence, experienced anxiety. Second, θ̃∗ decreases by proposition 1,
which in turn reduces experienced anxiety. It is easy to show that the second effect
dominates.26
Proposition 10. Experienced anxiety A is weakly decreasing in price p and the expected
investment cost c̄/2, i.e. ∂A
∂p
≤ 0 and ∂A
∂c̄
≤ 0. The effect of an increase in the prevention
technology’s effectiveness α on experienced anxiety is ambiguous.







consider the case of α2θL > sc̄+ αp.




s(α2θL− (2s− s2)c̄− (2s− s2)αp)
(1− s2)α2
26Implicit in the baseline model is the assumption that anxiety increases in the expected consumption
loss implied by having to pay c+ p with positive probability. Proposition 10 is robust to relaxing this








− (2s− s2)p < 0 (15)
Since I assume that αθL− c̄− p < 0, inequality 15 is satisfied.




s(α2θL− (2s− s2)c̄− αp)
(1− s2)α
,
which is negative, because αθL− c̄− p < 0.




s(α3θL(αθL− p)− c̄(2s− s2)(αp+ c̄))
(1− s2)α3
This derivative may be negative, e.g. when s is small, or positive, e.g. when s is
large.
This suggests that elevated levels of experienced anxiety might be more prevalent in
rich country settings, where p and c̄ relative to income are low. It is in these settings
that the physical payoffs warrant remaining realistic, even if this comes at the cost of
worrying.
D Price sensitivities
Several factors may depress the demand for preventative health care in poor settings.
Here, I study how three of the most plausible of such factors impact on the agent’s
sensitivity of demand. I denote the (exogenous) optimist by superscript o. She is
characterised by belief θo ∈ (0, θ) with ∂θ
o
∂z
= 0 for all z ∈ {p, c̄, α}. Her demand for







An impatient individual discounts t = 3 health outcomes when she decides whether or
not to invest in health care at t = 2. She has a discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and invests in
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Finally, a liquidity constraint individual can only invest in prevention for cost realisa-
tions such that c + p < m and m is so small that she cannot always make worthwhile







The corresponding sensitivities of demand in a variable z are are simply the first deriva-
tives in z. The following proposition highlights the difference between the sensitivity of
a realist’s demand in factors of the environment in comparison to that of other agents.
Proposition 11. Suppose that α2θL > sc̄, so that an individual who engages in de-
nial sometimes invests in prevention. Then the realist’s demand for preventative health
care is weakly more sensitive to changes in the environment than the demand of an




































































































The inequality in result ii holds, because αθoL, δαθL and m are each smaller than αθL.
The inequalities in result iii hold because θo and δθ are smaller than θ, but greater than
zero.
In combination with proposition 3, proposition 11 implies that the sensitivity of
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demand may be a good metric to distinguish motivated beliefs from other depressants
of demand. Motivated beliefs, but not other depressants of demand, generally imply a
higher sensitivity of demand to changes in the environment.
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